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What do German citizens think of their government’s handling of the Greek debt crisis? Imke
Henkel writes that the German media has helped to perpetuate a view of the crisis which pits ‘lazy
southerners’ against hard-working northern European taxpayers. However she also notes that this
interpretation has generated a backlash from many Germans who are keen to emphasise the value
of Europe as an ideal.
The German public has been fed a series of porkies since the start of the Greek crisis in 2010, and
many were happy to swallow them. The unrivalled German tabloid Bild notoriously led the war of
words, creating myths about German rectitude and Greek infamies: “Greek wine is famous for being intoxicating,
but now we need a clear head”, the paper stated as early as January 2010. Germans were asked “to open the
(empty) coﬀers” and to pay for lazy Southerners, Bild claimed: “Greece, but also Spain and Portugal have to
understand that hard work – meaning ironﬁsted money-saving – comes before the siesta”. The Greeks, the
inﬂuential tabloid bristled, tricked and lied their way into the euro, falsifying their accounts along the way. This set the
tone.
Myths are not just created by telling untruths, but also
by omitting parts of the truth. Yes, the Greek
government lied about their accounts when applying
to be accepted into the Eurozone. And they were
helped by Goldman Sachs in doing so. But when
Greece was welcomed into the euro there were
ample warnings that the country did not quite meet
the required criteria, as there were similar doubts
about Italy. In both cases it was a political decision to
ignore the warning voices.
When on 22 November 2004 Eurostat, the European
Oﬃce for Statistics, sent a report to all EU-Finance-
Ministers stating that the Greek government
misrepresented their ﬁnancial situation, measures
were imposed to make the Greeks give a more
truthful account of their balance sheet. But Germany
and France in particular were reluctant to punish
Greece, as they should have according to EU rules,
because both the German and the French governments had by then broken the Maastricht criteria themselves,
allowing their deﬁcits to rise well beyond the prescribed three per cent of GDP. Therefore the claim that devious,
cheating Greeks duped their way into the euro distorts the truth: the EU was complicit in the fraud.
The allegation that hard working German taxpayers had to cough up for work shy Greeks, however, is outright false.
The real picture is far more nuanced. Successive studies have shown that the German government beneﬁtted to the
tune of billions from lower borrowing costs, when Germany – in marked contrast to the troubled Southern states –
became a safe haven for investors into the euro. A study by the insurance company Allianz, for example, found in
September 2012 that Germany’s budget “reaped the beneﬁts of annual interest savings to the tune of around 10.2
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billion euros thanks to the euro crisis”. When German ﬁnance minister Wolfgang Schäuble managed to balance his
books, he should have thanked the crisis that according to Bild cost German taxpayers so dear.
Unfortunately it was and is not just the lurid German tabloid newspaper that have repeated the false stereotype of
hardworking Germans paying for lazy Greeks. The far more highbrow Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung follows the
same dichotomy of virtuous Northerners and dissolute Southerners. Northern European states, in this view, are right
because they are willing “to reform”. Not so Southern Europeans.
Holger Steltzner, one of four editors of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and responsible for the section on
business and economy, has argued since the beginning of the Eurozone crisis against the provision of rescue funds
by the European Central Bank, pleading for austerity as the only way of “reform”, thus echoing Jens Weidmann,
President of the German Bundesbank. Typically, Steltzner denotes the currency policy “becoming more Italian” when
further rescue funds are considered. For Steltzner, the European Union faces the decision of either becoming
economically more German, or breaking up, because a “transfer union” where the rich Northern states will pay for
the “unreformed” Southern states would not be viable.
Polls show that the stereotyping in the German media has had an eﬀect on the German public. When Bild asked its
readers earlier this month to vote on whether they would grant more support for Greece, an overwhelming 88 per
cent said no. More serious pollsters like YouGov ﬁnd that Germans tend to be notably more decisive in their views
against Greece remaining a member of the Eurozone than other nations. Over recent months a clear majority of
Germans preferred Grexit, whereas the French, Swedes and Danes had much less pronounced views. One poll by
the ﬁnancial blog Smava interestingly found that two thirds of their audience were against giving any more money to
Greece, when at the same time over 50 per cent were convinced that the Greek crisis would have no detrimental
eﬀect whatsoever either on their own life or the German economy in general. A recent poll for ARD
Deutschlandtrend paints a similar picture: that we Germans are sitting pretty, thank you very much.
This is of course the background against which German politicians decide how to act. Arguably it was the regional
elections in North Rhine Westphalia, one of the largest German Länder, in the spring of 2010, that prevented an
early solution. Chancellor Angela Merkel, anxious not to go against the public mood, hesitated to agree to the
necessary funds which could have stopped the crisis from spreading. Her party lost anyway, albeit narrowly, and so
did the EU. The hardline ﬁnance minister Wolfgang Schäuble, who more and more openly favours a Grexit, has
reached his best personal rating among Germans ever: At the start of this month a poll found an approval of 70 per
cent for Mr Schäuble’s work.
Even the Deputy Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel, leader of the more anti-austerity Social Democratic Party, which is
presently in a grand coalition with Merkel’s CDU, has started to oppose further support for Greece. Choosing no
other platform than Bild, Gabriel told his potential voters in June that: “We won’t let German workers and their
families pay for in parts excessive demands from a partially communist government”. Incongruously, Gabriel at the
same time promised humanitarian help should Greece go bust because the EU turned oﬀ the money tap. The
apparent contradiction can be reconciled when considering the ideology of the good, righteous German it springs
from: He (she) works hard and won’t pay for sluggards, but considering themselves being right and good will give
generously to the needy.
There is, however, a backlash. When in February Bild asked their readers to have their photograph taken holding up
a copy of the tabloid that stated in big letters on its front page: “No further billions for the greedy Greeks”, an
outraged outcry among many Germans followed. The German press regulator told Bild oﬀ for discriminating against
the Greeks. More recently a satirical video that furnished a conversation between two self-righteous Germans
entirely with quotes from Bild, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung und Der Spiegel, went viral. At the beginning of this
month, just ahead of the referendum, the weekly newspaper Die Zeit printed on its front page a bilingual plea in
German and Greek, begging Greeks to “please, stay with us”. The well-meaning Germans rise to speak again.
These are the romantic Germans, who dream of Europe as an ideal. As Sascha Lobo, a columnist for Spiegel
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Online and commentator on all things digital put it after the third bailout package had been agreed: He feels “pain”,
because his “Europe sentiment” has been destroyed. The notion of Europe, Lobo argues, has transformed from a
mutual idea into a mutual money problem. He quotes the preamble for the Treaties of the European Union which
spoke of the “cultural, religious and humanistic European inheritance”. If this European idea fell apart, Lobo fears, a
drama of unimaginable magnitude would ensue. Bernd Ulrich, deputy editor in chief of the weekly Die Zeit,
expresses a similar sentiment when he calls Europe “a touching, annoying, imposing thing” that should be admired
for what it has achieved, instead of being condemned for where it fails. “Artwork of the Century” reads the headline
for his front page admonition to pay Europe its due respect, if not love.
Yes, these well-meaning Germans are still in love with Europe. But as blinded lovers they fail to take a sharp,
probing, analysing look at what shape the EU will or should take in the years to come. Europe was conceived as a
political project to bring peace to the war-torn European people. But from the start it proved too diﬃcult to agree on
political ideas. Therefore economic treaties and unions of various shapes were created with the intention of
eventually making political consensus inevitable. Thus the European Coal and Steel Community evolved into the
European Economic Community, which was followed by the Single Market and the Eurozone. In the end the
idealists had created a monster that developed a frighteningly independent life.
Or have they? Will we need a central economic government in Europe that controls taxes, labour markets, social
beneﬁts and budgets of all member states in order to prevent a future Greek crisis? Or are there other ways that will
allow for much more diverging national economies without forcing the whole of the EU apart? It is deeply frightening
that these questions are only discussed among ‘Europe nerds’. The German approach to either self-righteously call
for Germanic economic rules for all Eurozone states, or to believe love-bombing Europe would make everyone
happy, will lead to disaster.
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